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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on managerial characteristics of micro and small-sized
firms. Using linked employer-employee data on the Portuguese economy for the
2010-2018 period, we estimate the impact of management teams’ human capital
on the probability of firms becoming financially distressed and on their subsequent
recovery. Our estimates show that the relevance of management teams’ formal
education on the probability of firms becoming financially distressed depends
on firms’ size and the type of education. We show that management teams’
formal education and tenure reduces the probability of micro and small-sized firms
becoming financially distressed and increases the probability of their subsequent
recovery. The estimates also suggest that those impacts are stronger for micro
and small-sized firms. Additionally, our results show that functional experience
previously acquired in other firms, namely in foreign-owned and in exporting firms
and in the area of finance, may reduce the probability of micro firms becoming
financially distressed. On the other hand, previous functional experience in other
firms seems to have a strong and highly significant impact on increasing the
odds of recovery of financially distressed firms. We conclude that policies that
induce an improvement in the managerial human capital of micro and small-sized
firms have significant scope to improve their financial condition, enhancing the
resilience of the economy against shocks.
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This paper adds to an increasing body of research that relates firms’ management
factors with the financial condition and overall performance of firms (e.g., Bloom et al.,
2016; Darrat et al., 2016; Huang and Hilary, 2018; Mion and Opromolla, 2014; Sazedj
et al., 2018). Using unique and rich linked employer-employee data, we contribute to a
better understanding of the role of management teams’ human capital in the financial
condition of micro and small-size firms.
Micro and small-sized firms are pervasive in the business structure of the Portuguese
economy. In 2018, firms under 50 workers account for 98,8% of total firms, 57,5% of
total employment and 50,3% of total value-added. However, micro firms show very low
productivity levels, corresponding to 60% and 56% of the productivity of medium and
large firms, respectively, in 2018 – see Table A1. A high share of micro and small-
sized firms has been related to resource misallocation and low productivity growth
(e.g., Garicano et al., 2016). Management is crucial for firms’ financial and operational
performance (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). However, most of the studies on
the impact of management in firms’ performance have been based on case studies and
surveys (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). Those approaches have focused on medium
and large-sized firms, being less effective in dealing with micro and small-sized firms.
The availability of firm-level data for the Portuguese population of firms, including
detailed information on the characteristics of management teams’ members and the
balance sheet and financial statement of firms, allows us to investigate the role of
management teams’ on micro and small firms’ financial condition.
During the international financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the sovereign debt crisis
in the euro area in the period 2010/2013, the Portuguese economy went through a se-
vere crisis. Between 2008 and 2013: real GDP decreased by 8%; employment decreased
13% and unemployment increased from 7.7% to 16.4% (INE, Statistics Portugal). The
Portuguese crisis was a debt and a banking crisis. The total debt of non-financial firms,
relative to GDP, reached a maximum of 152% in 2012, one of the highest in the world
(data from the Bank of Portugal). A large share of firms was highly leveraged and
unprofitable. In 2013, 34% of the firms had a negative EBITDA (Earnings Before In-
terest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization) and the average EBITDA to Operating
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Revenue ratio across all firms in the economy was -15.5% (data from SCIE, INE; further
details on data in subsection 2.1). Therefore, during the economic and financial crisis a
high share of firms was financially distressed — see Gouveia et al. (2018) and Carreira
and Teixeira (2016).
Firms’ financial distress, often associated with high leverage and lower performance,
has constituted a relevant branch of financial and macroeconomic literature that is re-
called to unveil countries’ productivity issues and hurdles in national economic growth
(e.g., Andrews and Petroulakis, 2019). Authors state that the steady survival of
financially distressed firms, commonly called zombie firms, act as distorting forces be-
hind aggregate capital allocation, given that their increasing maintenance by creditors’
forbearance yields credit congestion to more productive firms, hampers market com-
petition, and ultimately leads to decreases in national aggregate productivity growth
(e.g., Caballero et al., 2008; Andrews et al., 2017; Andrews and Petroulakis, 2019).
Several factors have contributed to a high and persistent incidence of financially
distressed firms: banks’ evergreen lending to inefficient firms (e.g., Caballero et al.,
2008; Fukuda and Nakamura, 2011; Acharya et al., 2019; Andrews and Petroulakis,
2019); high leverage and credit constraints (e.g., Schivardi et al., 2017); credit misallo-
cation due to underdeveloped financial markets (e.g., Reis, 2013; Gopinath et al., 2017;
Azevedo et al., 2018); and inefficient insolvency regimes (e.g., Andrews et al., 2017).
This paper contributes to this literature by exploring the role of management teams’
characteristics to the probability of firms becoming financially distressed and to their
subsequent recovery.
Nicholas Bloom, John Van Reenen and their co-authors have concluded that firms
with ’better’ management practices tend to be larger, to be more efficient, to grow
faster, and to have higher survival rates (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom
et al., 2013). Additionally, those authors also conclude that firms with more human
capital tend to have better management practices. Firms’ management teams are em-
powered with decisional ability and executive power which directly affects their pro-
ductivity, performance and their financial prospects (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Darrat
et al., 2016; Huang and Hilary, 2018; Chen et al., 2010; Lin and Lin, 2019). Managerial
human capital can be defined as the stock of routines, skills and knowledge embed-
ded in the governance structure, composed by individuals endowed with decisional and
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executive competencies that directly affect the organizational performance (e.g., Roos
et al., 1997). Human capital comprises both formal and tacit knowledge relevant to
economic activities. Hence, firms’ management boards human capital embody a varied
set of skills acquired through formal education and informal tacit components, that are
path-dependent such as training and experience, accumulated both transversally and
within the industry, which literature has proven to be crucial on firms’ performance
(e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
In our analysis, we consider three dimensions of management teams’ human capital.
First, managers’ formal education, measured by average years of schooling, the inclusion
in the management team of at least one manager with a college degree, and the share
of the management team with a college degree. Second, within-firm specific knowledge
proxied by managers’ tenure. Third, we consider four dimensions of functional experi-
ence formerly acquired in other firms: years of management experience in other firms;
previous experience in the area of finance; previous experience in international firms;
and previous experience in former exporting firms.
Education levels of the workforce and management teams have increased signifi-
cantly in the last decades, reducing the gap to European Union countries – see Almeida
et al. (2017). As noticed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), there is evidence of a positive
relationship between education and the quality of management practices. Management
teams that include members with a college degree are expected to make use of state
of the art management practices, namely the use of information and communication
technologies. The role of education is even more important for micro and small-sized
firms, where in most cases ownership and management coincide and firms have scarce
resources to hire new members to the management teams. Therefore, in our analysis,
we evaluate the impact of years of schooling and of having members in the management
team with a college degree.
Our second measure of human capital is within-firm specific knowledge. The ev-
idence on the benefits of a long-tenured management team is mixed. Li (2018) and
Huang and Hilary (2018) conclude that managers’ tenure and their firm-specific knowl-
edge affect companies’ overall performance according to their entrenchment level, with
positive learning effects up to an optimal threshold. A longer tenure results in a deep
knowledge of the firm and of its culture which improves communication and decisional
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processes. On the other hand, a long experience in the firm may reduce their openness
to innovation. Given the high coincidence of ownership and management, tenure in
micro and small-sized firms tends to be higher than in larger firms.
Expertise and knowledge spillovers from managers’ mobility (e.g., Mion and Opro-
molla, 2014; Mion et al., 2016; Sazedj et al., 2018), appear to have significant effect on
firms’ overall and financial performance. In our analysis, we evaluate the impact of pre-
vious functional experience acquired in other firms. We consider the overall experience
in other firms, previous experience in foreign-owned and exporting firms, and previous
experience in finance. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) stresses that multinationals are
better managed than domestic firms. Those authors also stress that exporting firms
are also better managed than firms that only produce for the domestic market. Mion
et al. (2016) infer that knowledge and experience brought by outsider managers may
have a significant effect on firms’ performance. Mion and Opromolla (2014) undertake
a track over years of the employees’ mobility on their manager status at each period in
the current firm, accounting for the previous export-based and matching exportation
experience, concluding for the positive impact of managerial aspects, such as export-
matching knowledge on firm trade performance. Sazedj et al. (2018) assess the impact
of newly recruited versus internally experienced CEOs on firms’ performance, during
the economic crisis, providing evidence that new knowledge and experience brought by
outsider CEOs have a significant effect on firms’ productivity and on their capability to
survive under negative economic shocks. Functional experience in the area of finance
was also found to be relevant to firms’ financial policies (e.g., Custódio and Metzger,
2014).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the databases
and variables and shows the statistics for our empirical measures of managerial human
capital. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses
the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
This section presents the databases and variables used in our empirical analysis and
describes their descriptive statistics, stressing their differences across firm-size classes.
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2.1 Linked employer-employee data
In this paper, we use linked employer-employee data to characterize managerial features
of Portuguese firms, to contribute to a better understanding of the role of management
teams in micro and small-sized firms’ financial condition. The analysis of management
teams’ characteristics based on microdata allows for a richer overview of their role
in micro and small-sized firms’ performance. Our approach, using linked employer-
employee data, in the vein of Mion and Opromolla (2014), complements the research
carried out by case studies and surveys (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
We use panel data drawn for the period 2008-2018 for the Portuguese economy, from
two main datasets: Personnel Records database (QP, ‘Quadros de Pessoal’, INE, 2018a)
on workers and the Integrated Business Accounts System (SCIE, ‘Sistema de Contas
Integradas das Empresas’, INE, 2018b) from Statistics Portugal’s Registry of Statistical
Units at the firm level. QP is a unique matched employer-employee dataset collected by
the Portuguese Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security, integrating yearly
data of all private firms, respective establishments and employees in Portugal, since
1986. It is disaggregated at the worker level, with a detailed track of each employee
(gender, age, tenure, educational level, monthly earnings, hours worked, occupation,
contract bond) and corresponding firm (location, industry sector, ownership structure,
creation date) over time. This dataset includes highly representative data of the national
labour market, with approximately 3,000,000 workers and 350,000 firms yearly.
SCIE involves all reported details on firms’ balance sheet and their financial state-
ment, required by governmental authorities yearly, and covers all non-financial firms
from 2006 onwards (about 350,000 firms, yearly). This dataset presents enriching infor-
mation at the firm level on economic and financial indicators, which allows us to obtain
all the information on firms’ capital structure and financial performance.
Our econometric analysis will cover the period that encompasses the international
financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 and
the economic recovery that followed. We focus on firms with a continuous record on
our databases and ten or more years old at the beginning of our panel.1
1Data on years 2008 and 2009 was exclusively used as lagged information to classify all financially
distressed firms over the period 2010-2018. 2018 is the latest year available at the time this study was
carried out.
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Firms’ organisation complexity and management structure varies significantly ac-
cording to size (e.g., Lucas, 1978; Garicano et al., 2016). In our analysis we will show
the results for the whole sample and by firm size, focusing on micro and small-sized
firms. We consider the following four firm-size classes: Micro which includes firms with
up to 9 workers; Small which includes firms with a workforce between 10 and 49 work-
ers; Medium which includes firms between 50 up to 249 workers; and Large including
firms with 250 workers or more. Table A1 in the Appendix presents detailed data for
those four size classes of the population of Portuguese firms.
2.2 Management and financial variables
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of firms’ financial distress.
We investigate the role of management teams’ characteristics on the probability of
firms becoming financially distressed and on their subsequent recovery. Our definition
of financially distressed firms (henceforth, FDF) follows the OECD approach presented
in McGowan et al. (2017). FDF show an Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) - given by the
ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses - inferior to one, over three consecutive years.
The 3-year period on assessing the state of financial distress allows for accommodating
economic downturns and temporary business decline (Gouveia et al., 2018). We only
consider firms that are at least ten years old to avoid equivocal grading of start-up
companies as financially distressed firms.
FDF and their weight in the economy significantly increased during the sovereign
debt crisis, between 2010 and 2013. In 2012, the share of FDF in total firms reached
a peak of 15.1%, 19.8% of total employment and 11.8% of total value-added. The
economic recovery after 2013 led to a decreasing relevance of FDF, in a similar trend
to other southern European countries (McGowan et al., 2017; Gouveia et al., 2018;
Andrews et al., 2017). However, in 2018, FDF still accounted for 4.4% of total firms,
9.9% of total employment and 6.3% of total value-added. Financial distress prevails
among micro and small-sized firms: in 2012, FDF represented in these size categories
93.6% of total FDF, 29.8% of FDF employment, and 20.8% of total value-added in FDF.
Still with considerable weight in 2018, micro and small-sized financially distressed firms
constituted 87.8% of total FDF, 12% of FDF employment and 9.1% of FDF total value-
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added.
Once the ICR is bigger than one for two consecutive years we classify the firm as
recovered from its condition of financial distress (Recovered) – see Table 1. Using that
definition, Table A3 in the Appendix, presents the data with the evolution of recov-
ered and non-recovered firms. In the period 2011-2017, the share recovered financially
distressed firms increased continuously from 7.8% to 66.1%, reflecting the economic
recovery started in 2013.
Our linked employer-employee databases, covering the population of firms in the
Portuguese economy, allow us to identify the management teams and to describe several
dimensions of managers’ characteristics and expertise. Our data include information on
managers’ education, tenure and age. We also have the information for the whole life
professional experience of managers, namely the industry they have worked or whether
they have had professional experience in a firm involved in international trade or with
a share of foreign capital.
Executive decisions which ultimately affect firms’ capital and labour structure are
held not only by the general manager but by a group of upper tiers such as high-level
directors or key senior managers reporting to the administration board (Carpenter,
2002). This perspective suggests that even though the strict executive power is entailed
by the CEO, there is a frequent decision-making process shared with an influential
management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In this vein, the variable Manager has
been constructed by selecting all top managers, namely CEOs and executive directors,
plus all firms’ highest-level department directors, according to QP dataset classification.
Using the CPP2010 national classification of occupations2 for the period after 2009 and
CNP943 for the period before 2010, occupational codes in this definition correspond
to four and two categories, respectively. In the CPP2010 national classification of
occupations, we consider as members of the management team: Managing Directors and
Chief Executives (112); Administrative and Commercial Managers (12); Production
and Specialized Services Managers (13); and Hospitality, Retail and Other Services
Managers (14). In CNP94 national classification of occupations, we consider as members
of the management team: Corporate Managers (12); and General Managers of Small
2Classificação Portuguesa das Profissões 2010 - CPP 2010, Statistics Portugal, corresponding to
ISCO-08 international nomenclature.
3Classificação Nacional das Profissões CNP/94, Statistics Portugal.
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Table 1: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
Financially Distressed Firm (FDF) FDF = 1 if financially distressed; 0 otherwise.
FDF has been defined as having an interest cov-
erage ratio inferior to one over three consecutive
years.
SCIE
Recovered Financially Distressed Firm Recovered=1 if the firm recovered from the finan-
cially distressed status; 0 otherwise. Recovered
firm is defined as being in a non-FDF state over
two consecutive years.
SCIE
Managers’ age AgeManager = managers’ average age QP
Managers’ education EducManager = managers’ average years of
schooling
QP
Manager with a college degree CollegeManager = 1 if at least one manager has a
college degree; 0 otherwise
QP
Share of managers with a college degree ShareCollegeManager = share of managers with a
college degree (%)
QP
Managers’ tenure TenureManager = managers’ average years in the
firm
QP
Managers’ experience ExpManager = managers’ average years of experi-
ence in former firms
QP
Managers’ experience in finance FinExpManager = managers’ average years of
overall finance experience in former firms
QP
Managers’ experience in foreign-
owned/ international firms
IntExpManager = managers’ average years of ex-
perience in former international firms
QP
Managers’ experience in exporting
firms
ExportExpManager = managers’ average years of
experience in former exporting firms
QP
Leverage Ratio LevRatio = Total Liabilities/Total Equity and Li-
abilities
SCIE
Productivity per worker Productivity = Gross Value-Added at cost of fac-
tors (/1000 euros)/Total Workers
SCIE
Exports ratio ExportsRatio = Total Exports/Total Sales
Turnover
SCIE
TeamManagerSize Number of individuals in the management team QP
NWorkers Number of workers by each firm SCIE
Sources: SCIE and QP.
Businesses (13).
All firms in our longitudinal panel have at least one top or department manager
in their directorate boards. Our sample is fairly representative. In 2018, firms with
a corporate society status with at least one manager represent about 25% of all the
companies with at least 2 workers in the SCIE dataset and account for 68% percent
of employment and 70% of value-added of all economic activities, except the primary
sector. In this sample, firms aged as ten or more years with at least one manager and a
continuous non-intermittent record over the panel represent approximately 28% of all
firms with at least one manager, and account for 68% of value-added and 60% of total
employment of firms with at least one manager, respectively 48% of total value-added
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and 41% of total employment of all SCIE firms dataset.
In our empirical analysis, managerial human capital variables include three cate-
gories: formal knowledge, given by the education of the members of the management
team; tacit firm-specific knowledge, given by tenure; and tacit non-firm specific knowl-
edge, given by functional experience previously acquired in other firms – see Table 1
for a description of these variables.
As mentioned in Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), education is highly correlated
with management scores. Therefore, we expect more educated managers to have a
better management performance, namely on the financial dimension. In our empirical
analysis we consider three measures of formal education: i) managers’ average years of
schooling, EducManager; ii) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if at least one
manager has a college degree, CollegeManager; iii) share of managers with a college
degree, ShareCollegeManager, which proxies the degree of homogeneity within the
management team.
Tacit firm-specific knowledge is measured by the average years of tenure of the man-
agement board, TenureManager. As discussed in the previous section, the evidence
concerning the impact of firm-specific knowledge on firms’ performance is mixed (e.g.,
Huang and Hilary, 2018).
Non-firm specific tacit knowledge is gauged by four proxies of managerial functional
background. Management overall experience, ExpManager, given by the average years
of management experience that the members of the management team have accumu-
lated in former firms. Finance overall experience, FinExpManager, as the average
years acquired in former firms in a finance intermediate or senior position. In the QP
dataset those positions correspond to the following occupational CPP2010/ ISCO-08
codes: 1211 - Finance Managers; 1346 - Financial and Insurance Services Branch Man-
agers; 241 - Finance Professionals; 331 - Financial and Actuarial Associate Profession-
als. This variable intends to capture the accumulated experience in finance positions,
most relevant to deal with firms’ investment decisions and the execution of their fi-
nancial strategy. Custódio and Metzger (2014) concludes that having a background in
finance matters for corporate performance and particularly for firm financial manage-
ment. Güner et al. (2008) suggests that financial expert CEOs have better access to
external financing and have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity.
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Another variable of functional background is given by former experience in interna-
tional foreign-owned firms, IntExpManager. Foreign-owned firms are defined as those
with more than 50 percent of their total equity belonging to foreign capital, which in-
cludes all multinational companies and multinational enterprise subsidiaries. Finally,
we will also consider managers’ former export experience, ExportExpManager, given
by the average years of managerial experience obtained in exporting firms, which we
define as firms with an exports-to-sales ratio superior to the national average during
three consecutive years – see Berthou et al. (2015) for alternative measures of export-
ing firms. Mion and Opromolla (2014) conclude that managers’ export experience is an
important determinant of firms’ performance.
In respect to firm-level financial and performance indicators we consider three con-
trols: i) Leverage, LevRatio, given by the ratio of liabilities to total equity and liabili-
ties; ii) Productivity, Productivity, measured by the gross value-added in thousands of
euros per worker; iii) Exports-to-sales ratio, ExportsRatio, a measure on firms’ export
capacity computed as the share of total exports over total sales.
All the variables used in our empirical analysis are presented and described in Table
1.
2.3 Management features, firms’ financial condition and size
Given the focus of our analysis, Table 2 presents the averages for the full sample (Panel
A) and the subsamples of non-financially distressed firms (non-FDF) (Panel B) and
financially distressed firms (Panel C), for the years 2011 and 2018 and for the four
firm-size classes considered in our empirical analysis.
Management teams’ characteristics show a significant variation across different firm-
size classes. The human capital variables considered in our analysis increase monoton-
ically with firm-size. For example, in 2018, differences in average years of school-
ing, EducManager, ranged from 10 years in micro firms, 11.2 in small firms, 13.2 in
medium firms to 14.5 in large firms – see columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Panel A in Table
2. The percentage of management teams that include a member with a college degree,
CollegeManager, is also much lower in micro and small-sized firms than in medium
and large-sized firms. For example, in 2018, 25.6% and 47.9% of micro and small-sized
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firms, respectively, had a least one member in their management teams with a college
degree, whereas those percentages were 82.5% and 96.8% for medium and large-sized
firms, respectively – see Panel A in Table 2. These patterns apply to all measures of
human capital considered in our analysis.
The variables on the management team education -EducManager, CollegeManager
and ShareCollegeManager - show a significant improvement between 2011 and 2018,
for all firm-size classes, both for non-FDF and FDF. These improvements in the edu-
cation levels of management teams reflect the progress in education in Portugal in the
last decades (e.g., Almeida et al., 2017).
Between 2011 and 2018, there was an increase in average years of schooling of
managers, EducManager, from 10 to 10.6, an increase in the percentage of firms with
at least one member in the management team with a college degree, CollegeManager,
from 30.6% to 36%, and an increase in share of the management team with a college
degree, ShareCollegeManager, from 23.6% to 28.3% – see columns 9 and 10 of Panel
A in Table 2.
Small and medium-sized firms show an increase in the share of managers with a
college degree, ShareCollegeManager, around 5 and 6 percentage points, respectively
– see columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Panel A in Table 2. On the other hand, micro firms
show an increase of only 3 percentage points in the percentage of firms with at least
one manager with a college degree and in the share of managers with a college degree
– see columns 1 and 2 in Panel A in Table 2.
A striking result is that FDF seems to have improved management teams’ formal
education more than non-FDF. Considering the statistics for the aggregate in 2018,
we contend that FDF management teams average education was 11.1 years (10.6 years
for non-FDF); there were 42.9%FDF with at least one manager with a college degree
(35.7% in non-FDF); FDF had a 33.5% share of managers with a college degree (28%
for non-FDF) – see Panels B and C in Table 2.
Between non-FDF and FDF, management teams’ education also varies with the
firm-size category. Small and medium FDF management teams show higher levels of
education than their non-FDF counterparts. In 2018, average years of schooling of
managers in small and medium FDF were, respectively, 12.3 and 14.1, whereas for
non-FDF those values were 11.2 and 13.1 – see Panels B and C in Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for full sample, non-FDF and FDF by firm size (2011 – 2018)
Panel A: full sample
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018
AgeManager 49.8 53.6 48.9 52.6 47.3 50.3 46.6 49.5 49.4 53.1
EducManager (years) 9.5 10.0 10.7 11.2 12.6 13.2 14.0 14.5 10.0 10.6
CollegeManager (%) 22.3 25.6 42.4 47.9 77.1 82.5 93.7 96.8 30.6 36.0
ShareCollegeManager (%) 19.0 22.2 29.7 34.4 50.6 56.4 66.8 73.5 23.6 28.3
TenureManager (years) 14.9 19.9 15.2 19.6 14.6 17.5 13.3 16.5 14.9 19.6
ExpManager (years) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.8 2.3 1.8 4.7 0.2 0.6
FinExpManager (years) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.5 1.4 3.5 0.2 0.4
IntExpManager (years) 0.003 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 2.2 0.03 0.1
ExportExpManager (years) 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.9 0.04 0.2
LevRatio 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7
Productivity (/1000 Euro) 18.9 22.0 27.5 30.5 35.0 36.3 38.8 39.2 22.0 25.4
ExportsRatio (%) 2.0 2.2 7.5 9.0 22.7 26.2 26.2 29 4.6 5.9
TeamManagerSize 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.3 5.0 5.0 19.8 17.7 2.0 2.1
NWorkers 5.8 6.0 25.5 28.4 121.8 141 1050.9 1271.1 25.8 35.8
Firms by size 34,720 11,723 2,404 407 49,254
Observations by size 223,092 82,804 18,238 3,326 327,460
Observations (share %) 68.1 25.3 5.6 1.0
Panel B: non-FDF
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018
AgeManager 49.6 53.6 48.8 52.6 47.2 50.4 46.5 49.5 49.3 53.1
EducManager (years) 9.5 10.0 10.6 11.2 12.5 13.1 14.1 14.5 10.0 10.6
CollegeManager (%) 22.7 25.5 41.2 47.3 75.7 82 93.8 96.3 30.5 35.7
ShareCollegeManager (%) 19.5 22.2 28.8 34 49.5 55.9 67.9 73.3 23.7 28.0
TenureManager (years) 14.7 19.9 15.3 19.6 14.7 17.7 13.3 16.5 14.9 19.7
ExpManager (years) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8 2.2 1.7 4.6 0.2 0.6
FinExpManager (years) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.3 3.4 0.1 0.4
IntExpManager (years) 0.003 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 2.3 0.02 0.1
ExportExpManager (years) 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.9 0.04 0.2
LevRatio 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Productivity (/1000 Euro) 20.4 22.5 28.8 30.9 36.6 36.7 42.0 41.4 23.5 25.8
ExportsRatio (%) 2.0 2.1 7.7 9.1 23.9 27.1 28.1 29.6 4.7 5.9
TeamManagerSize 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.3 4.9 5.0 18.1 17.2 2.0 2.1
NWorkers 5.8 6.1 25 28.5 120.7 141.4 939.5 1211.9 24.2 33.8
Firms by size 32,299 10,939 2,242 376 45,856
Observations by size 196,944 74,467 16,152 2,774 290,337
Observations (share) 67.8 25.6 5.6 1.0
Panel C: FDF
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018
AgeManager 50.4 54.7 49.3 52.1 47.4 49.7 46.9 49.6 50 53.4
EducManager (years) 9.3 10.1 11.2 12.3 13.2 14.1 13.8 14.7 10.0 11.1
CollegeManager (%) 20.1 26.2 50.7 60.3 85.1 90.7 93.1 100 31.1 42.9
ShareCollegeManager (%) 16.2 22.6 35.4 44.4 56.9 64.3 61.7 74.9 23.0 33.5
TenureManager (years) 15.5 20.4 15.1 17.7 14.3 14.6 13.3 16.3 15.3 19.1
ExpManager (years) 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.3 4 2.1 5.3 0.3 1.1
FinExpManager (years) 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.5 3.8 0.2 0.7
IntExpManager (years) 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.5 0.7 2.0 0.04 0.3
ExportExpManager (years) 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.7 0.1 0.3
LevRatio 1.2 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.4
Productivity (/1000 Euro) 9.8 10.9 18.1 20.8 25.4 30.8 24.3 24.3 12.6 15.6
ExportsRatio (%) 2.0 2.6 6.3 6.7 15.6 12.4 18.0 25.5 3.8 5.3
TeamManagerSize 1.6 1.4 2.4 2.4 5.7 5.7 27.4 21.1 2.3 2.7
NWorkers 6.2 4.9 29.4 26 128.2 133.8 1552.3 1668 35.6 80.4
Firms by size 7,810 2,392 509 105 10,816
Observations by size 26,148 8,337 2,086 552 37,123
Observations (share) 70.4 22.5 5.6 1.5
Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP. We report variables’ averages.
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Size also matters to differentiate between FDF and non-FDF in higher education
measures. In small and medium FDF, in 2018, the relative weight of having at least
one graduate member in the management team, CollegeManager, amounted to 60.3%
and 90.7%, respectively (ShareCollegeManager, 22.6% and 44.4%), against 47.3%
and 82% in those size categories for non-FDF (ShareCollegeManager, 22.2% and
34%). Although departing from lower values in 2011, the presence of higher educated
managers in micro FDF has noticeably improved, reaching 26.2% in 2018, above non-
FDF counterparts (25.5%) – see Panels B and C in Table 2.
On tacit within-firm knowledge, the variable TenureManager increased, on average,
in all size classes between 2011 and 2018, suggesting the steadiness of management
teams in the same firm over time. Considering the year 2018, data on Panel A in Table
2 shows that tenure decreases monotonically with firm-size, ranging from 19.9 years in
micro firms to 16.5 years in large firms. Except for medium-sized firms, this variable
reported a similar trend between FDF and non-FDF – see Panels B and C of Table 2.
Regarding management teams’ overall functional experience acquired in other firms,
there was a significant improvement in all variables, between 2011 and 2018 – see Table
2. Micro firms stand out as showing a very small increase in management teams’
human capital brought in by managers with previous experience in other firms. On the
other hand, medium and large firms have increased substantially functional experience
acquired in other firms, namely in the area of finance, FinExpManager, in foreign-
owned firms, IntExpManager, and in exporting firms, ExportExpManager.
In all size classes and particularly visible in medium and large firms, FDF man-
agement teams show higher experience in overall management, ExpManager, and in
finance fields, FinExpManager, than non-FDF. Concerning experience in international
foreign-owned firms, IntExpManager, and in exporting firms ExportExpManager, ex-
cept for large firms, management teams in FDF show a higher average than in non-FDF
– see Panels B and C in Table 2.
Table 2 also reports statistics for firms’ financial and performance indicators, used
as control variables in our estimations. From 2011 to 2018, these measures reveal
an improvement in firms’ financial conditions reflecting economic recovery after 2013.
FDF exhibit higher leverage ratios, LevRatio, and lower labour productivity levels,
Productivity, and export ratios, ExportsRatio, than their non-FDF counterparts – see
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Panels B and C in Table 2. This evidence is in line with existing literature on the topic
– see, for example, Andrews et al. (2017).
Table 2 shows that productivity increases monotonically with firm-size. In 2018, it
was 22, 30.5, 36.3 and 39.2 thousand euro for micro, small, medium and large firms,
respectively – see Panel A in Table 2. Between 2011 and 2018, productivity in the
aggregate increased from 22 to 25.4 – see Panel A in Table 2. Productivity increased
for micro, small and medium-sized non-FDF and FDF – see Panels B and C in Table
2. Overall, from 2011 to 2018, it ranged from 23.5 to 25.8 in non-FDF and from 12.6
to 15.6 in FDF.
Non-FDF, except for micro firms, show a significant decrease in the leverage ratio,
LevRatio, from 2011 to 2018. In turn, FDF except for large firms, show an increase in
leverage on that period. It is in micro FDF where the leverage ratios have deteriorated
more between 2011 and 2018, respectively from 1.2 to 1.7. Finally, the exports-to-
sales ratio, ExportsRatio, increased in all size classes of the whole sample – Panel
A in Table 2, in the period 2011-2018, from 4.6% to 5.9%. It reflects the increasing
internationalization of Portuguese firms in the last decades. Except for medium-sized
firms, the export ratio substantially increased in FDF, particularly in micro (from 2%
to 2.6%) and large firms (from 18% to 25.5%).
3 Econometric strategy
The main hypotheses of this paper state that management teams’ human capital in
its different forms - formal education, within-firm specific knowledge, and functional
experience formerly acquired in other firms - affect the likelihood of micro, small and
medium-sized firms to become financially distressed and their odds of subsequent re-
covery. Therefore, our estimations aim at evaluating the following hypotheses:
i) Does management teams’ human capital reduce the probability of financial dis-
tress, namely of micro and small-sized firms?
ii) For firms in a state of financial distress, does management teams’ human capital
increase the odds of recovery, namely of micro and small-sized firms?
iii) Does the impact of management teams’ characteristics on the financial condition
of firms vary across firm size?
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In order to test those hypotheses we make use of the longitudinal nature of the data,
using a panel data logit estimator which accounts for firms’ unobserved heterogeneity.
We estimate by firm-size classes the following model:
P (FDFit = 1|Xit,β, αi) =
exp (βXit + αi)
1 + exp (βXit + αi)
(1)
where the dependent variable is the probability that firm i, in moment t, is financially
distressed, i = 1, ..., N firms, t = 1, ..., T periods and αi represents firms’ (unobserved)
heterogeneity. Xit is the vector of all explanatory and control variables.
Concerning the explanatory variables, we consider three alternative measures of
management teams’ human capital. First, managers’ formal education will be captured
by three variables: EducManager, CollegeManager and ShareCollegeManager. Sec-
ond, within-firm specific knowledge will be proxied by managers’ tenure, TenureManager.
Third, functional experience formerly acquired in other firms is measured by four vari-
ables: ExpManager, FinExpManager, IntExpManager and ExportExpManager.
As control variables, we consider LevRatio, Productivity and ExportsRatio. All vari-
ables are included according to the definition presented in Table 1.
Firms’ financial distress condition may be the result of previous decisions by man-
agement teams. Therefore, explanatory variables related to management teams are
lagged one period. The inclusion of lagged independent variables also mitigates poten-
tial endogeneity issues.
We use an identical econometric procedure to evaluate the role of management
teams’ human capital on the odds of recovery of financially distressed firms, which is our
second hypothesis. In this stage of our econometric strategy, the dependent variable is
the probability of FDF to recover. Recovery status is defined by firms’ interest coverage
ratio bigger than one for at least two consecutive years, after its FDF status. The non-
recovery status includes firms that remained in a financially distressed condition plus
all financially distressed firms that have exited the market in the following years. Given
that registry is officially updated each year for any firm in our national datasets, the
classification of exit is associated with the absence of registry of any given firm which
was once registered.
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We use the results of the models described above, estimated for the four subsam-
ples of our firm-size classes, to evaluate how the impact of the management team’s
human capital on the financial condition affects micro and small-sized firms and how it
compares with medium and large-sized firms. This way, we test our third hypothesis.
Table A2, in the Appendix, presents the summary statistics for the variables used
in our empirical analysis.
4 Results
4.1 Probability of financial distress
In this section we test the first and the third hypotheses of our paper, that is, we
investigate the role of management teams’ human capital in reducing the probability
of financial distress and how it varies with firm size. The results of the estimates of the
Logit model specified in equation 1, in Section 3, for the four size-classes subsamples,
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 presents the estimates for our three measures of formal education: managers’
average years of schooling, EducManager, Panel A; a dummy variable indicating if at
least one manager has a college degree, CollegeManager, Panel B; and the share of the
management team that has a college degree, ShareCollegeManager, Panel C. In all
models, we consider the variable TenureManager as a measure of within-firm specific
knowledge.
The results presented in Table 3 show that the impact and the statistical signifi-
cance of the management teams’ formal education on the probability of firms becoming
financially distressed depends on firm size and on the measure of formal education that
we include in our estimations.
Except for large firms, higher average years of schooling, EducManager, reduces
the probability of firms becoming financially distressed – see Panel A in Table 3. The
impact of managers’ education is stronger for micro and small firms, being statistically
significant at the 1% level. For medium-sized firms, the effect is smaller and it is only
statistically significant at the 10% level. The inclusion of at least one manager with a
college degree in the management team, CollegeManager, is only relevant for micro
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Table 3: Estimation results by firm size on Probability of FDF (2011 – 2018)
Micro Small Medium Large
Panel A
EducManager -0.120∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.099∗ -0.095
(0.015) (0.021) (0.056) (0.144)
TenureManager -0.122∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.046
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.038)
Panel B
CollegeManager -0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
TenureManager -0.120∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.049
(0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.039)
Panel C
ShareCollegeManager -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009)
TenureManager -0.121∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.045
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.038)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *, 10%; **,
5%; ***, 1%. Size: Micro firms <10 workers; 10 ≤ Small firms <50
workers; 50 ≤ Medium firms <250 workers; Large firms ≥ 250 workers.
Observations report only to firms with varying outcome. The number of
observations for Micro, Small, Medium and Large firms is 32,170, 9,452,
2,130 and 538, respectively; the number of firms included in each one of
these estimations is 4,594, 1,339, 293 and 70, respectively. Source: own
computations using data from SCIE and QP.
firms, being statistically significant at the 1% level – see Panel B in Table 3. Finally,
concerning the impact of our third measure of formal education, the share of managers
with a college degree, ShareCollegeManager, on the reduction of the probability of
the firm becoming financially distressed is only relevant for micro and small firms, being
statistically significant at the 1% level – see Panel C in Table 3.
The results for the subsample of large firms are statistically non-significant for all
kinds of formal education – see column four in Table 3. These results may be explained
by the small number of large firms in the sample (70) and the fact that the management
teams of these firms have a very high level of education – see Table 2.
In what concerns our second category of managerial human capital, TenureManager,
which measures tacit firm-specific knowledge, our results presented in Table 3 show that,
except for large firms, a more experienced management team with better knowledge of
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inner processes and the firm’s business model, reduces the probability of financial dis-
tress, partially verifying the findings of Huang and Hilary (2018). The effect is stronger
for micro firms than for small and medium firms, being highly statistically significant
for those three firm-size categories.
Summing-up, the results presented in Table 3 show that the three measures of the
management teams’ formal education and firm-specific knowledge reduce the probability
of micro, small and medium-sized firms becoming financially distressed. Those results
also suggest that the impact of both forms of management teams’ human capital on
firms’ financial condition decreases monotonically with firm size.
The estimations presented in Table 4 consider managers’ years of schooling as
the measure of formal education, EducManager, and four indicators of management
teams’ functional experience acquired in other firms: managers’ years of previous ex-
perience in other firms, ExpManager; previous experience in the area of finance,
FinExpManager; previous experience in international firms, IntExpManager; and
years of experience in former exporting firms, ExporExpManager.
Our results suggest that the four measures of functional experience previously ac-
quired in other firms are relevant to reduce the probability of micro firms being finan-
cially distressed. However, some of the variables that measure functional experience
are also relevant for small and medium-sized firms. The results, in Panel A, show
that management experience accumulated in other firms, ExpManager, seems to be
relevant to micro and medium-sized firms. Variable FinExpManager is statistically
significant at the 10% and the 5% level for micro and medium-sized firms, respectively,
while being statistically non-significant for small and large firms – see Panel B in Table
4. To have members in the management board with former experience in foreign-owned
firms, IntExpManager, seems to be relevant for micro and small-sized firms to avoid
becoming financially distressed – see Panel C in Table 4. These results complement Li
(2018), who conclude that managers’ international experience has a positive effect on
firms’ trade performance. Finally, having higher previous experience in firms involved
in international trade, ExportExpManager, also reduces the likelihood of small-sized
firms being financially distressed, which adds to the findings of Mion and Opromolla
(2014) – see Panel D in Table 4.
All control variables included in the model show the expected effect on the proba-
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Table 4: Estimation results by firm size on the probability of FDF (2011 – 2018)
Micro Small Medium Large
Panel A
EducManager -0.057∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.065
(0.014) (0.021) (0.052) (0.144)
ExpManager -0.063∗∗ -0.039 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.051
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.047)
Panel B
EducManager -0.058∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.076
(0.014) (0.021) (0.052) (0.142)
FinExpManager -0.070∗ -0.012 -0.092∗∗ -0.079
(0.041) (0.030) (0.037) (0.057)
Panel C
EducManager -0.059∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.076
(0.014) (0.021) (0.051) (0.143)
IntExpManager -0.464∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.112
(0.212) (0.072) (0.049) (0.073)
Panel D
EducManager -0.058∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.078
(0.014) (0.021) (0.051) (0.142)
ExportExpManager -0.276∗∗ -0.064 -0.059 -0.102
(0.116) (0.053) (0.050) (0.074)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *, 10%;
**, 5%; ***, 1%. Size: Micro firms <10 workers; 10 ≤ Small firms
<50 workers; 50 ≤ Medium firms <250 workers; Large firms ≥ 250
workers. Observations report only to firms with varying outcome.
The number of observations for Micro, Small, Medium and Large
firms is 32,154, 9,452, 2,130 and 538, respectively; the number of
firms included in each one of these estimations is 4,592, 1,339, 293
and 70, respectively. Source: own computations using data from
SCIE and QP.
bility of firms being financially distressed: lower debt or leverage ratios, higher produc-
tivity levels and exportation capacity help prevent firms from financial distress.
4.2 Recovery of financially distressed firms
In this section we investigate the impact of management teams’ human capital on the
odds of recovery of financially distressed firms, that is the second hypothesis we test
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in this study. We also gauge the variation of that impact across firm sizes, that is the
third hypothesis to be tested.
As described in Section 3, we classify a firm as recovered from a condition of fi-
nancial distress when the interest coverage ratio is bigger than one for two consecutive
years. Table A3, in the Appendix, presents data for the number of firms that recov-
ered from a condition of financial distress since 2010. Table A4, in the Appendix,
presents the summary statistics of management teams’ human capital by firm size, for
recovered and non-recovered FDF, for the years 2011 and 2017. When compared to non-
Recovered FDF firms, recovered FDF show a lower relative weight of higher educated
managers in management boards, reported by the dummy variable of CollegeManager
and ShareCollegeManager in Table A4. This evidence suggests that non-recovered
FDF retain a considerable share of the highly qualified managerial workforce in their
directorates, which supports the findings in literature characterizing the importance
of factor misallocation in financially distressed firms and less productive organizations
(e.g., Gouveia et al., 2018; McGowan et al., 2017; Gopinath et al., 2017). Additionally,
managers of recovered FDF are more tenured and show slightly higher overall manage-
ment, finance, international and exporting experience, features that turn out to play
an important role in firms’ financial performance.
Results presented in Tables 5 and 6, confirm the relevance of managerial human
capital, namely formal education, within-firm specific knowledge, and functional expe-
rience of the management team acquired in other firms, to the recovery of financially
distressed firms.
Table 5 presents the estimations of the impact of management teams’ formal edu-
cation and tenure in the recovery of financially distressed firms. The three measures
of formal education – EducManager, CollegeManager and ShareCollegeManager –
suggest that more educated management teams increase the likelihood of recovery of
micro, small and medium-sized financially distressed firms. In these size categories,
the measures of formal education EducManager and ShareCollegeManager are sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level – see Panels A and C in Table 5. Having at least
a manager with a college degree, CollegeManager, is only statistically significant for
micro and small-sized firms. It should be stressed that the magnitude of the effect of
formal education is higher for micro and small-sized financially distressed firms.
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Table 5: Estimation results by Firms’ Size on Probability of Recovery (2011 – 2017)
Micro Small Medium Large
Panel A
EducManager 0.618∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.289
(0.033) (0.041) (0.096) (0.208)
TenureManager 0.549∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.148∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.023) (0.082)
Panel B
CollegeManager 0.022∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011)
TenureManager 0.525∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.143∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.079)
Panel C
ShareCollegeManager 0.062∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.015)
TenureManager 0.542∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.132∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.080)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *, 10%;
**, 5%; ***, 1%. Size: Micro firms <10 workers; 10 ≤ Small firms
<50 workers; 50 ≤ Medium firms <250 workers; Large firms ≥ 250
workers. Observations report only to firms with varying outcome.
The number of observations for Micro, Small, Medium and Large
firms is 16,787, 4,576, 1,055 and 186, respectively; the number of
firms included in each one of these estimations is 2,951, 795, 177
and 29, respectively. Source: own computations using data from
SCIE and QP.
In what concerns our second category of managerial human capital, TenureManager,
that measures within firm-specific knowledge, our results show that a more experienced
management team, with a better knowledge of the firm and of its business model, in-
creases the likelihood of the firm to recover from financial distress – see Table 5. Except
for large firms, the effect of TenureManager is statistically significant at the 1% level.
It should also be stressed that the effect is stronger for micro and small firms, highly
reliant on tacit knowledge.
Finally, in Table 6, we present the estimates of the impact of functional experience
previously acquired in other firms on the probability of firms’ recovery from a condition
of financial distress. Our results suggest that the four variables considered in our anal-
ysis – ExpManager, FinExpManager, IntExpManager and ExportExpManager
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Table 6: Estimation results by Firms’ Size on Probability of Recovery (2011 – 2017)
Micro Small Medium Large
Panel A
EducManager 0.195∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.484∗∗
(0.022) (0.034) (0.084) (0.231)
ExpManager 0.270∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.045) (0.047) (0.195)
Panel B
EducManager 0.198∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.556∗∗
(0.022) (0.034) (0.082) (0.223)
FinExpManager 0.293∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.053) (0.056) (0.196)
Panel C
EducManager 0.200∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.332
(0.022) (0.034) (0.081) (0.213)
IntExpManager 0.758∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.179
(0.345) (0.137) (0.078) (0.171)
Panel D
EducManager 0.197∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.342
(0.022) (0.034) (0.081) (0.216)
ExportExpManager 1.281∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.544∗∗
(0.497) (0.122) (0.073) (0.273)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *, 10%;
**, 5%; ***, 1%. Size: Micro firms <10 workers; 10 ≤ Small firms
<50 workers; 50 ≤ Medium firms <250 workers; Large firms ≥ 250
workers. Observations report only to firms with varying outcome.
The number of observations for Micro, Small, Medium and Large
firms is 16,787, 4,576, 1,055 and 186, respectively; the number of
firms included in each one of these estimations is 2,951, 795, 177
and 29, respectively. Source: own computations using data from
SCIE and QP.
– increase the likelihood of recovery of micro and small-sized financially distressed
firms, being statistically significant at the 1% level – see columns 1 and 2 in Table
6. Managers’ prior experience in other companies, ExpManager, and former finance
experience in other firms, FinExpManager, also increases the likelihood of recovery
of medium and large-sized financially distressed firms, being statistically significant at
the 1% level – see Panels A and B in Table 6. Previous experience in foreign-owned
firms, IntExpManager, is also relevant to the recovery of medium-sized financially dis-
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tressed firms, but it is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, previous
experience in exporting firms, ExportExpManager, may as well help in the recovery
of medium and large-sized financially distressed firms. The estimations presented in
Table 6 also suggest that the impact of functional experience previously acquired either
in foreign-owned or in exporting firms is stronger for micro and small-sized firms.
In what concerns the control variables, our results show that high-leveraged firms
with higher exports-to-sales ratio have a higher probability of recovery. Additionally,
firms with higher productivity also have a higher probability of recovery, confirming
previous findings (e.g., Carreira and Teixeira, 2011).
5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. On the one hand, it contributes to the
literature on the determinants of firms’ financial distress condition. Several authors have
emphasized the role of leverage and credit constraints or the misallocation of resources
that result from inefficient or underdeveloped financial markets. In this paper, we
contribute to that literature by investigating the impact of management teams’ human
capital on the probability of firms becoming financially distressed.
On the other hand, the availability of linked employer-employee databases that
include all the population of Portuguese firms, allows our analysis to be focused on micro
and small-sized firms. Micro and small firms are pervasive in the business structure of
the Portuguese economy, accounting for more than half to total employment and value-
added.
Our estimates show that management teams’ formal education reduces the proba-
bility of firms becoming financially distressed and increase the odds of their subsequent
recovery. However, our results also show that the relevance of management teams’ hu-
man capital depends on firms’ size and the type of education – average educational
level and higher education. Namely, we show that management teams’ formal educa-
tion has a stronger and highly significant impact in reducing the probability of micro
and small-sized firms becoming financially distressed and in increasing the chances of
their subsequent recovery. We also conclude that functional experience previously ac-
quired in other firms, namely in foreign-owned companies, exporting firms and in the
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area of finance, may reduce the probability of micro firms becoming financially dis-
tressed. Finally, previous functional experience in other firms seems to have a strong
and highly significant impact in increasing the odds of recovery of financially distressed
firms. Summing-up, our results suggest that Portuguese micro and small-sized firms
could improve their financial performance by increasing management teams’ human
capital.
Despite significant improvements in the last decades, Portuguese firms’ management
teams still lag behind European Union education levels. These results suggest that
policies that induce an improvement in the managerial human capital of micro and
small-sized firms may contribute to a better financial condition, reducing the likelihood
of firms entering a state of financial distress. Therefore, more educated management
teams may contribute to enhance productivity and the resilience of the economy against
shocks, such as the pandemic COVID-19.
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Table A1: Summary statistics by firm size (2011 – 2018)
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018 2011 2018
Sample
Firms 30,969 18,477 10,718 7,611 2,253 1,793 396 339 44,336 28,220
NWorkers 181,045 111,032 273,768 216,384 274,307 252,787 416,163 430,889 1,145,283 1,011,092
Firms (% total) 69.85 65.47 24.17 26.97 5.08 6.35 .89 1.2
NWorkers (% total) 15.81 10.98 23.9 21.4 23.95 25 36.34 42.62
Value-added (% total) 9.71 7.86 21.44 20.58 27.18 28.09 41.67 43.48
National SCIE datasets
Firms 324,336 376,719 31,246 31,876 4,699 4,488 713 684 360,994 413,767
NWorkers 877,013 957,551 667,437 763,734 495,932 564,599 624,719 707,378 2,665,101 2,993,262
Firms (% total) 89.9 91.1 8.7 7.7 1.3 1.1 0.2 0.2
NWorkers (% total) 32.9 32.0 25.0 25.5 18.6 18.9 23.4 23.6
Value-added (% total) 24.2 26.7 22.4 23.6 22.2 21.8 31.2 27.9
Source: own computations using data from SCIE.
Table A2: Summary statistics (2018)
Mean Std.dev. Perc. 1 Median Perc. 99 Min Max
FDF 0.04 0.20 0 0 1 0 1
AgeManager 53.11 7.68 35 53 68 20 68
EducManager 10.58 3.98 4 11 17 4 20
CollegeManager 36.05 48.01 0 0 100 0 100
ShareCollegeManager 28.28 40.89 0 0 100 0 100
TenureManager 19.65 8.05 0 20 40 0 59
ExpManager 0.58 1.94 0 0 11 0 13
FinExpManager 0.38 1.45 0 0 8 0 13
IntExpManager 0.11 0.86 0 0 5 0 13
ExportExpManager 0.17 1.05 0 0 6 0 13
LevRatio 0.75 1.22 0 1 8 0 11
Productivity 25.40 22.73 -4 20 134 -25 179
ExportsRatio 5.86 18.49 0 0 95 0 100
TeamManagerSizes 2.11 4.84 1 2 11 1 419
NWorkers 35.83 311.72 2 8 421 2 26,857
Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP. The number of observations is
28,220. ‘Std.dev.’ stands for standard deviation; ‘Perc.’ stands for percentile.
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Table A3: Evolution of recovered FDF (2011 – 2017)
non-Recovered Recovered Aggregate Share recovered (%)
2011 6,457 548 7,005 7.8
2012 6,280 890 7,170 12.4
2013 5,458 1,359 6,817 19.9
2014 4,508 2,013 6,521 30.9
2015 3,452 2,694 6,146 43.8
2016 2,648 3,219 5,867 54.9
2017 1,828 3,568 5,396 66.1
Firms 10,944 4,509 10,946 41.2
Observations 36,963 14,291 51,254 27.9
Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP.
Table A4: Summary statistics for non-Recovered and Recovered FDF by firm size (2011 – 2017)
Panel A: non-Recovered
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017
AgeManager 50.4 54.1 49.3 51.9 47.5 49.2 46.7 49.4 50.0 53.1
EducManager 9.3 9.9 11.2 12.1 13.2 13.8 13.9 14.6 9.9 10.9
CollegeManager 19.8 24.2 50.9 56.8 85.0 87.0 94.3 100 30.4 39.0
ShareCollegeManager 15.9 20.9 35.6 42.1 57 61.3 62.5 74.4 22.6 30.6
TenureManager 15.4 19.9 15.1 18 14.3 14.8 13.3 16.3 15.3 18.9
ExpManager 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.3 3.3 2.2 4.9 0.3 0.8
FinExpManager 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.2 1.5 3.4 0.2 0.6
IntExpManager 0.003 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.2 0.7 2.4 0.03 0.2
ExportExpManager 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.5 0.1 0.2
LevRatio 1.3 1.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.5
Productivity 9.0 9.1 17.8 20.4 24.8 28.2 24.7 23.7 11.8 13.7
ExportsRatio 1.9 2.5 6.2 7.5 15.7 17.6 18.5 21.7 3.7 5.4
TeamManagerSize 1.6 1.5 2.4 2.3 5.7 5.1 28 29.7 2.2 2.8
NWorkers 6 5 29.3 26 128.4 126.6 1573.1 2099.7 34.1 81.1
Firms by size 7,966 2,372 503 103 10,944
Observations by size 26,463 8,024 1,972 504 36,963
Observations share (%) 71.6 21.7 5.3 1.4
Panel B: Recovered
Micro Small Medium Large Aggregate
2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017 2011 2017
AgeManager 50.2 53.3 50.1 52.1 47.4 49.7 40.1 49.3 50.1 52.8
EducManager 9.1 9.4 10.4 11.5 12.8 13.7 14.8 14.3 9.4 10.1
CollegeManager 16.2 19.6 42.1 50 85.7 87.1 100 96.6 21.7 29.7
ShareCollegeManager 14.3 16.6 31.6 36.7 50.7 61.9 71.4 65.8 17.7 23.3
TenureManager 14.4 19.5 16 18.4 13.7 16.1 8.4 15.7 14.6 19.1
ExpManager 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.9 2.0 4.5 0.2 0.5
FinExpManager 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.9 4.0 3.4 0.1 0.3
IntExpManager 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.2 0.3 0.6 4.0 1.7 0.03 0.1
ExportExpManager 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 1.6 0.03 0.1
LevRatio 2.1 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.9 1.3
Productivity 12.1 16.4 19.1 24.3 30.0 32.0 35.3 30.7 13.6 18.9
ExportsRatio 2.4 1.8 10.5 7.9 37 20.5 0.1 24.1 4.4 4.2
TeamManagerSize 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.2 7.6 5.5 21.0 15.3 1.7 1.9
NWorkers 4.7 5.3 24.2 25.6 110.6 136.4 777 1773.3 11.5 30.1
Firms by size 3,413 874 192 30 4,509
Observations by size 10,728 2,813 644 106 14,291
Observations share (%) 75.1 19.7 4.5 0.7
Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP.
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